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This paper addresses the question as to why we observe such large differentials in 
earnings in urban African labour markets after controlling for observable human capital. 
We first use a three year panel across Ghana and Tanzania and find common patterns for 
both countries assuming that movement  between occupations is exogenous. Unobserved 
individual market ability is by far the most important factor explaining the variance of 
earnings. Sector differences do matter even with controls for ability and the sectoral gap 
between private wage employment and civil servants is about 50 per cent, once we 
control for unobserved time-invariant factors. Wage earners earn the same as the self-
employed in both Ghana and Tanzania. An additional important aspect of formality is 
enterprise size. At most half of the OLS effect of size on earnings can be explained by 
unobservable ability. Workers in largest firms are the high earners with wage rates which 
exceed those of civil servants. We then use an extension of the Ghana panel to five years 
to assess the extent of possible biases from the assumption of exogenous movement. We 
find evidence that this is important and that OLS may be understating the extent of both 
the size effect and the private sector wage (negative) premium. The implications of our 
results for understanding the nature of formal and informal employment in Africa are 
discussed.    
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CSAE WPS/2010-031 Introduction
This paper investigates the role of formality and informality in determining earnings in 
urban Africa using individual panel data. While the importance of activities which take 
place in small scale, unregulated and untaxed enterprises has been widely recognised, 
how these activities link to self-employment and how both link to larger scale enterprises 
which are regulated and taxed has not been investigated with data that allows for the 
potential importance of skills, both observable and unobservable, in determining these 
outcomes. There has been an extensive discussion of how the informal sector should be 
defined and of its implications for poverty, initiated by the seminal ILO (1972) study of 
Kenya. Since then, informality has been a generic term given to the diverse range of 
economic activities that takes place among the small scale enterprises and the self-
employed which dominate urban labour markets in Africa. The complexities in 
measuring incomes, outputs and employment when labour markets are not organised in 
the form of a formal wage contract are central to the analysis of duality in labour markets 
synthesised and extended by Sen (1975). The existence of the informal sector has been 
hypothesised to be the result of the regulations in the formal sector, see Schneider (2005) 
for this view and a cross-country analysis of the size of the informal sector.  
The existence in tandem of an informal and a formal sector has been viewed as 
the result of labour market segmentation in which the formal sector sets wages above the 
market clearing rate, leaving either a large pool of unemployed or an informal sector 
oversupplied with labour at markedly lower wages rates; the classic model of this 
interpretation being Harris and Todaro (1970). This model was extended by Fields (1975) 
who introduced the notion of there being a “murky” sector in which all those who wish to 
work can and postulating a divide within the urban sector between this “murky” sector 
and the formal sector. In contrast, it is possible to view the informal sector as an efficient 
outcome of a labour market in which a technology intensive in unskilled labour exists 
alongside a formal sector using relatively skilled workers at much higher wages. 
Fajnzylber, Maloney and Rojas (2006) provide evidence that small scale self-employment 
is a preferred outcome and not the result of an inability to find a rationed formal sector 
job. Given the scarcity of skills in low income countries and the much wider range (a 
significant part of the working population has no education) the greater diversity of 
2economic activities than are observed in higher income economies is to be expected. The 
fact, which earnings functions clearly show, that workers in large firms or in the formal 
sector earn more, even with controls for observable skills in the form of education and 
work experience, simply shows the importance of unobservable skills in determining 
these labour market outcomes.
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Our objective in this paper is to advance understanding of which of these 
interpretations is most consistent with data for earnings across these sectors for urban 
labour markets in Ghana and Tanzania. One reason why explanations have proliferated 
much faster than testing is the problem posed by measuring incomes in the informal 
sector. If we seek to address the possibility that the outcomes we observe are due to 
unobservable skills by means of panel data we need to measure changes too. That 
essentially is the contribution of this paper.  
  
This paper presents new survey data specifically designed to address this 
question. Like many existing data sets, the survey collects a wide range of socioeconomic 
data from workers in urban areas of two African countries: Ghana and Tanzania. The 
survey is novel in collecting income data on the self-employed in the urban informal 
sector. This data is intended to be comparable to wage data for urban employees. In both 
Ghana and Tanzania, the self-employed outnumber wage employees by at least 2-to-1 in 
the urban labor force. Understanding earnings determination in this sector, and how 
workers sort between sectors is thus central to any understanding of labor markets and 
income distribution in these countries. 
The following section presents our theoretical framework, section 3 our data and 
section 4 our empirical results. Our empirical strategy for disentangling the effects of 
human capital and labor market segmentation acknowledges that workers may 
endogenously sort between occupations based on observable and unobservable skill 
differences. Our approach exploits potential instruments for occupation choice as well as 
1 Söderbom and Teal (2004) show that wages in manufacturing firms are clearly linked to size, Söderbom, 
Teal and Wambugu (2005) show for both Kenya and Ghana that the firm size effect for wages does not 
appear to be driven by unobservables, Kahyarara and Teal (2007) show for Tanzania the importance of size 
in determining the return to both academic and vocational education. As these studies are confined to wage 
employment they are uninformative of the determinants of size in explaining gaps between self and wage 
employment. 
3the panel dimension of our data set to investigate the extent of biases from both OLS and 
fixed effects approaches in section 5. A final section concludes.  
2 Observable and Unobservable Skills
In the literature for developed countries there has been an extensive discussion 
initiated by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) of the relative importance of 
unobserved individual characteristics on earnings relative to the factors associated with 
the firm in which the individual is employed. Their basic equation which we will adapt in 
this paper is: 
(1)         =     +    +   ( , ) +         +     
where     is the natural log of earnings,     is a vector of time-varying observables,    is 
the time-invariant individual characteristics,   ,  will be the sector   in which individual   
works at time  . A time dummy captures all effects that are common at a point in time 
and     is an error term. In Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) the term   , captured 
the firm in which the worker is employed. In the case of urban labour markets in Africa 
most employment is not wage employment so we seek to identify movement across 
sectors where our data allows us to know if employment is in the civil service, a state or 
private enterprise, all these being forms of wage employment, and a final category for the 
self-employed. These four sectors capture some aspects of what has been meant by 
formal and informal enterprises. Indeed some models simply define wage employment as 
formal and see self-employment as a sector into which those who cannot find wage jobs 
end up working. We believe such an approach is to miss the fact that much wage 
employment is in small enterprises which can readily be characterised as “informal” and 
some form of self-employment activities, for example lawyers and accountants, are well 
paid. As we cannot usefully model the firm in which the individual works, we have 
chosen, in addition to modeling sector, to measure the size of the enterprise. We do this 
for both wage employees and for the self-employed by creating variables which measure 
the number of employees in the enterprise in which they work and thus form part of the 
time varying observable vector    . By controlling for size we are implicitly identifying 
the individual and the sector effect, conditioning on the size of the enterprise. Not only 
4does this enable us to model informality as a heterogeneous phenomenon related to 
enterprise size, it also allows for a set of controls which might be biasing what we can 
think of as the “pure” sector effect.  
The identification strategy used by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) is based 
on the assumption of exogenous movement. For the first part of this paper we will 
emulate their approach using our panel to identify the effects of time varying observables, 
which in our case include enterprise size, and following their procedure we will assess the 
relative importance of    and   ( , ) for the determination of earnings. We can write:  
(2)        =    +     
where    is a vector of time invariant observables (in our model these will be controls for 
education and gender) and    captures the time invariant unobservables. The conclusion 
of Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) is that these    terms are by far the most 
important factor determining earnings. While more recent work has qualified the relative 
importance of such measures of market ability as a determinant of earnings, their 
importance is a common factor across all labour market datasets. Their potential 
correlation with the observables factors, such as size and sector, ensure that the estimates 
for these effects may be subject to serious bias. We derive an index of such ability 
defined as: 
(3)                =      
where   is an N x N matrix of indicators of individual  =1,2... . 
We will estimate equation (1) by panel techniques, so in using fixed person effects it will 
not be possible to identify separately    and  . We use our estimates of the individual 
fixed effects as our dependent variable in (2) and identify   from the residuals of that 
equation. By imposing  =0  we scale our ability index in the same manner as Abowd, 
Kramarz and Margolis (1999). To identify   we need to observe individuals over time.  
On the other hand, to identify   , we need to observe workers move across 
sectors. Given that, we can use fixed effects results to calculate an index which 
summarises how important are sectors in determining earnings. We define such index as: 
(4)        sec    =      
where   is the NT x J matrix of indicators for the firm effect at which i works at date t.  
5Our assumption is that sector simply acts as a shifter of the earnings-profile while tenure 
effects are common across sectors and, therefore, do not feature in the sector index. The 
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) approach is slightly more general, as seniority 
effects are included in    They have : 
(5)       =    +        
(6)       =     +    +    +       +          +     
When we tested for the impact of sector-specific seniority on earnings, we did not find 
significant differences. Hence, we assume that tenure has a homogeneous effect across 
sectors. 
We still need to distinguish between general work experience which is in     and the 
within sector tenure (seniority) effect    . Our sector index, therefore, is defined as 
follows: 
(7)      =     
where   0is the NT x J design matrix associated with the vector of sector specific 
intercepts   is a J x 1 vector of sector-specific intercepts is the So: 
(8)        sec    =   =      
The answer to the question as to how important are time varying observables relative to 
person and sector effects can be found from a variance decomposition of the following 
equation:  
(9)     =    +    +              +      sec    +          +   
Equation (9) is our initial focus in this paper. The debate on informality in Africa has 
been essentially a debate as to the importance of the sector index relative to the ability 
index. To simplify the views of the alternative models: the Harris-Todaro (1970) model 
sees sector differences driving employment and unemployment outcomes while a human 
capital model of the world sees a sector differential as being an artifact of the failure to 
control for ability. 
The above analysis is implicitly for earning rates, ie wage rates for wage 
employees or their hourly equivalent for the self-employed. Wage contracts often specify 
both earnings and hours. What we measure is earnings per period of time but we also 
have data on hours spent working. In our data the majority of work is self-employment 
and hours worked are both important to determine the earnings rate which can be 
6compared with the wage rate available from wage employment and likely to be measured 
with considerable error. Rather than compute hourly rates of earnings, which will then 
incorporate the errors from the hours data, we report the results with controls for hours. 
We interpret these regressions with controls for (log of) hours as the equivalent to the 
earnings functions that underlie the Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) analysis. 
The next issue that needs to be addressed is selection into employment. A 
substantial part of the urban population aged 15 to 65 is classified both in our data, and in 
household surveys in Africa more generally, as out of the labour force. One interpretation 
of this finding is that these are individuals for whom either wage or self-employment jobs 
offer such low returns that they choose not to take them. Whatever the reason there is 
clear evidence that those in employment may be a selected sample. We will address this 
problem by assumption; namely that our ability to control for unobservables with the 
panel also controls for selection. This assumption does however change the interpretation 
of    which is now not simply ability in the job but includes the (time-invariant and 
unobservable) ability to get a job. 
Finally we need to recognize the key role that the assumption of exogenous 
movement has played in the model up this point. To interpret any of our results as causal, 
even with controls for unobservables, requires that individuals do not sort across 
occupations in the light of unobserved sector specific ability or that there are time varying 
unobservables which are correlated with the regressors of interest. In particular as 
Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2009) have forcibly argued if there is more than one ability 
“type” then it is possible that IV estimates will exceed any OLS estimate if the IV 
procedure succeeds in identifying the increase in earnings for an individual in a sector, 
relative to what would have been earned in the alternative sector for that individual. We 
return to this point in section 5 where we seek to allow for endogenous movement. To 
implement such a model needs panel data and the creation of the panel is described in the 
next section. 
3T h e  D a t a
Our data is taken from a longitudinal labor market survey conducted by the Centre for the 
Study of African Economies (CSAE) at Oxford University, under the direction of the 
7authors and in collaboration with the Ghana Statistical Office (GSO) and the Tanzania 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). We refer to the data set as the Ghana and Tanzania 
Urban Panel Survey (UPS). The survey collects information on incomes, education and 
labor market experience, household characteristics and various other modules for labor 
force participants (ages 15 to 60) in urban areas. For Ghana these areas span the four 
largest urban centers in the country: Accra (and neighboring Tema), Kumasi, Takoradi 
and Cape Coast. In Tanzania, the sample covers several of the largest urban areas 
including Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Iringa, Morogoro, Mwanza, and Tanga. 
The samples were based on a stratified random sample of urban households from 
the 2000 census in Ghana and the 2000 Household Budget Survey (HBS) in Tanzania.
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Two unique features of the UPS data set are important for answering the questions 
posed in this paper. First, the UPS provides comparable information, including income 
data, on both wage employees and the self employed. All labor force participants in the 
selected households were to be interviewed. Thus the sample of workers spans the formal 
and informal sectors, public and private employees, the self-employed, unemployed and 
so on. 
 
While the initial sample was household based, interviews were conducted on an 
individual basis, and the unit of analysis in most of what follows will be at the individual 
level. A total of 830 and 543 individuals were interviewed in the first round of the survey 
in Ghana and Tanzania respectively, which was conducted between October 2003 and 
June 2004. 
Collecting income data on the self-employed in low-income countries is a 
controversial endeavor. The problem is that self-employed business people in the 
informal sector rarely keep written accounts and their self-reported income data may be 
too noisy to be of use. For household based enterprises, the distinction between business 
and personal expenditures may be completely alien to respondents. We acknowledge the 
validity of these concerns. 
2 We should note that the analysis in this paper does not incorporate data from the Ghana Manufacturing 
Enterprise Survey (GMES). The UPS and the GMES are conducted in parallel with a common survey 
instrument. However, we restrict ourselves in this paper to the population based sample of the UPS, 
excluding the firm-based sample of manufacturing employees interviewed through the GMES. 
8However, because the non-agricultural self-employed constitute a majority of the 
urban working population in both Ghana and Tanzania, we feel the incomes in this sector 
are too important to ignore. Our income measure for the self-employed is based on self-
reported profits. Profits are net of routine operating expenses and gross of fixed capital 
expenditure, if any. The concepts of ``revenue'', ``business costs'', and ``profits'' are 
explained to respondents by enumerators with experience in conducting firm and 
household surveys. As the surveys are entered directly onto handheld computers, a simple 
mechanical check forces enumerators to go over the numbers again if revenue, cost and 
profit figures are inconsistent. While enumerators have reported few conceptual 
difficulties with this portion of the questionnaire, we feel a better test of the validity of 
self-reported income data is our ability to explain its variation with personal, household 
and business characteristics, as we attempt to do below. 
A second unique feature of the UPS data set is its panel dimension. The 
individuals have been resurveyed for a period of three years in Tanzania and for five in 
Ghana. Thus the UPS constitutes one of very few household panel data sets in sub-
Saharan Africa, and the only panel of income dynamics for the self-employed that we are 
aware of. In Table 1a and 2 we present the transition matrices for the two Ghana panels 
we will be using, that for the three years 2004-06 and the five years 2004-08. Table 1b 
presents similar data for the three year 2004-06 Tanzania panel. These matrices introduce 
the sectors that will be the focus of the analysis in the next two sections. Individuals are 
classified into five mutually exclusive groups, self-employed, private wage, civil 
servants, public enterprise and not working. The first four of these have earnings and it is 
these who will be used in the regressions reported below. Possibly surprisingly there is 
less movement in the five year than the three year Ghana panel. For this panel the largest 
change is within public enterprise which is also the category with the smallest numbers.  
The self-employed in both Ghana and Tanzania have the lowest mobility. The summary 
statistics on which the analysis will be based are given in the Appendix.  
Table 3 presents the OLS results for each wave of the survey and for a pooled 
regression for both Ghana and Tanzania. The results confirm what numerous cross-
section based studies have established namely that sectoral differences do appear to be an 
important determinant of earnings. Civil servants earn some 2.5 times what private wage 
9employees earn, with a full set of controls for human capital. Strictly this comparison is 
for wage employees in firms of size 1 as the equation also controls for firm size which 
has a large impact on earnings for both countries. In moving from a firm of size 1 to one 
of size 100 the regression predicts a 2-2.5 times rise in earnings, again this comparison is 
with the full set of controls for observable human capital. Two other features of the data 
stand out. The first is the strongly convex relationship between earnings and education, 
something widely found in developing country data sets and secondly that wage 
employees earn less than the self employed in firms of size unity showing the importance 
of not assuming that the self-employment sector is a free entry, low income, sector. As 
has previously been noted in Sandefur, Serneels and Teal (2006) a striking feature of this 
data is how great is the overlap in the distributions within these categories. Figure 1shows 
the distribution for earnings not only by wage and self-employment but by the size 
dimensions within each. This confirms that controls for observable human capital do not 
alter the ranking in terms of income where working in large firms and in self-employment 
with employees is the high return activity. The data for education confirms for both 
countries a monotonic increase in education from self-employment through small to large 
firms to the public sector. Also true for both countries is that younger workers are 
concentrated in small firms. 
 
4 Measuring the Role of Unobservables
In the previous section we have presented a standard earning function and shown that it 
has the characteristics one would expect. We now proceed to ask how far any of the 
findings with respect to sectoral effects or size survive once we allow for the role of 
unobservables.  
Table 4 presents a series of results which do control for time invariant 
unobservables. These are the first key results of the paper. All columns control for 
experience. In columns (1) and (2) we focus simply on the sectoral effects. As can be 
seen by a comparison of columns (3) and (4) with columns (1) and (2) controls for size 
are important. While these effects are much reduced from the OLS they are still large and 
significant in both countries. In both countries the dummy on civil servants is significant 
in columns (3) and (4) but the differential between these and private wage employees is 
10now only 38 per cent, down from a differential of 2.5 times. Before considering the 
interpretation of these results we complete the decomposition set out above. In Table 5 
we decompose the fixed effect   , obtained from the First Stage Regression in Table 3, 
into true unobserved heterogeity    and a part that can be associated with time invariant 
observables such as gender and education. Not surprisingly this re-creates the convex 
return on education we observed in the OLS earnings functions. Given the results from 
Table 5 we can extract from the data our Ability Index and we present the results in 
Figure 2. Both distributions are close to normal. We also create the Sectoral Index set out 
above and in Table 6 we bring together the ingredients of our analysis to address the 
relative importance of formality and informality in the determination of earnings.  
Table 6 presents the second set of key results of the paper. The Table is set up so 
that the relative importance of time varying determinants of earnings in Columns (1) and 
(2) can be compared with the inclusion of time invariant gender and human capital 
measures in Columns (3) and (4). These results can in turn be compared to Columns (5) 
and (6) which include the Sectoral index and finally Columns (7) and (8) add the Ability 
Index. It is apparent that sectoral effects are far less important than individual effects in 
explaining the variance of earnings, although they are highly significant. The  2 rises 
from 0.27 to 0.83 for Ghana and from 0.33 to 0.83 for Tanzania when we add the Ability 
Index to the equation. This result is very similar to that in Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis 
(1999) who find that these individual effects dominate earnings variance. It also is 
consistent with the argument of Mortensen (2005) that observable human capital explains 
relatively little of the variance of earnings.  
For both countries we find that the size effects both within firms and among the 
self-employed remain large and significant even after controlling for sector and ability. 
We can see from Table 4 that in both Ghana and Tanzania the wage employees in small 
enterprises (strictly enterprises of size 1) do not earn significantly different amounts from 
the self-employed. The implication of the size coefficient is that those working in large 
firms (of more than 100) will earn on average more than the civil servants who have the 
highest sector differentials. In the next section we discuss how the results might be 
affected by movement and sorting across the occupations.  
115 Endogenous  Movement 
The results in our second stage regression appear to confirm the importance of sector and 
size effects as determinants of earnings. The two most clear-cut findings are a gap 
between the private and the public sector, larger for Tanzania than Ghana but highly 
significant in both, and a highly significant firm size effect for both countries. In this 
section we address the question as to how robust are these results. Identification of the 
size and sectoral effects has been obtained by following the procedure of Abowd, 
Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and assuming the exogeneity of movement. We now relax 
this assumption and investigate possible endogeneity biases. Before presenting the results 
of these estimators we return to the potential sources of bias in our results raised in 
section 2 above. The exogeneity assumption we have used to identify the coefficients of 
interest does not allow endogenous sorting of workers across occupations. As pointed out 
by Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2009), in the context of interpreting the expected bias in 
the standard Mincerian earnings function, it is far from obvious that OLS estimates will 
be biased upwards. In this context the usual intuition would be that high ability 
individuals sort into wage employment assuming that wage employment is the preferred 
outcome and that ability is uni-dimensional. It assumes in the language of treatment 
effects that: 
 (  0| =1 ) >  (   0|  = 0) 
In words, the income for those treated if they had not been treated would have been 
higher than the actual outcome for the untreated. Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2009) 
argue that sorting may well reverse this inequality in which case OLS estimates will be 
biased down. In this context a high wage premium may be due to the fact that those good 
at being wage employees sort into that occupation and that the OLS estimate will be 
biased down as a result of such sorting. 
Our results cannot be directly compared to the standard treatment literature as we 
are seeking to control for unobserved dimensions of the wage contract by means of a 
firm-size variable. The interpretations of the size effect discussed by Oi and Idson (1999) 
mainly focus on the role of unobserved skill in creating a size effect with the implication 
that fuller controls for skills will diminish any “size” effect. Our results are certainly 
consistent with that view as the firm size effect approximately halves when we use fixed 
12effects. However if size is proxying the unobserved “ability at being a wage worker 
across firms of different size” then the selection bias points in the opposite direction. 
Another problem is measurement error which will in general bias down the estimates in 
the fixed effects regressions. We need instruments to address these potential sources of 
endogeneity. 
We proceed by exploiting the panel dimension of the data to use lags as 
instruments, as initially proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). In their estimator the lags 
of the variables are used as instruments for the first differences (the DIFF-GMM 
estimator programmed in STATA). Our approach is to treat all the time-varying job-
characteristics as endogenous, since they may be linked to unobservables determinants of 
movement.
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  The data requirements posed by GMM techniques in terms of lags is high. In 
order to ensure that our results are as robust as possible we use only the Ghana data 
where we have a five, rather than three, year panel. Our results up to this point have 
enabled us to make a direct comparison of Ghana and Tanzania. By confining ourselves 
to the longer panel data set for Ghana we can no longer make comparative statements but 
we can assess the potential importance of the biases that arise from the failure to allow 
for the biases due to movement.  
 This implies that in order to instrument the first-difference of these variables 
by their lags, one needs to go back at least 2 periods to find valid instruments. In addition 
to instrumenting the first differences of the regressors by means of their lags, the System 
GMM estimator as proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998), introduces a set of moment 
conditions based on the assumption that lagged differences of the regressors are 
independent from current unobservables. We present results for both estimators. As is 
well known the results of these estimators can be sensitive to the number of instruments 
so in order to assess how robust are the results to these different instrument procedures 
we present results making different assumptions about the instrument set.  
  Tables 7 and 8 present the results first for the differenced then for the system 
GMM estimator. As we are now using a five year panel we present in the first two 
3 The only exceptions are Total Labour Market Experience (which, by construction, is just a function of 
time) and Common Time Effects (captured by the time-dummies). These variables are treated as exogenous 
with respect to individual unobservables at time t and therefore treated as “classic instruments”. One could 
view these variables as “instrumenting themselves”in the system GMM regressions. 
13columns the OLS and FE results which enable a comparison to be made for the Ghana 
results of the three year panel presented in Tables 3 and 4. We also present the results for 
the first differenced estimator (FD) to assess if any of our result are sensitive to whether 
we use this or the FE. It can be seen that there are some differences between the FE and 
FD but the broad pattern is very similar. 
  Our primary interest now is how our instrument sets affects our results. For both 
Tables 7 and 8 in Column (4) we use a set of instruments which includes all lags between 
periods  t-2 and t-4. In Column (5) we collapse the lags in the manner suggested by 
Roodman (2009). In Column (6) we confine the instruments to those for periods t-2 and t-
3 only. Finally in Column (7) we restrict the instrument set still further and use only lags 
for  t-2. For reasons which have been extensively discussed in the literature where 
variables are highly persistent the system GMM estimator should provide more robust 
results assuming that the data are stationary. Thus our preferred results are those in Table 
8. The rather striking result for this Table is that for all the instrument sets with which we 
have experimented the IV estimate for the size effect is substantially higher than the OLS. 
It is also the case that the point estimate on the private dummy which has a magnitude of 
-0.354 in the OLS has a maximum (negative) value of -0.969 in our second instrument 
set. These instrumental variable estimates suggest that the OLS is understating the sector 
and size effect, not overstating them. While the differenced GMM results presented in 
Table 7 are less robust there is no evidence there either that OLS is upward biased.    
  
5 Conclusions
We have used panel data from Ghana and Tanzania to address a question that has been 
central to how their urban labour markets work since the seminal model of Harris and 
Todaro (1970) on the links between formal wages and employment. A development of 
this framework by Fields (1975) postulated the importance, within the urban economy, of 
a distinction between a low income “murky” and a high income formal sector. By 
exploiting two sets of individual based panel data we have sought to adapt the framework 
provided by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) to show the importance of sectoral 
effects relative to the unobserved aspects of ability in determining these differences in 
14incomes. We have then extended their procedure by instrumenting the variables using the 
estimators developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  
Our results using the FE estimator and the IV point in opposite directions as to the 
signs of the bias in the OLS. Confining attention to our largest sample which is the Ghana 
five year panel the use of either FE or FD reduces, in some cases substantially, the point 
estimates for both the private wage (negative) premium and the size effect. In contrast the 
IV estimates increase both in absolute size. This latter result is consistent with the 
argument advanced by Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2009) that endogenous sorting is a 
key feature of these markets. If this is correct then the focus of Harris and Todaro (1970) 
and Fields (1975) on sectoral differences in income misses the quantitative importance of 
sorting by type within these markets. 
A result which is common across both the FE and the IV estimators is that the size 
effect cannot be explained by time invariant skill unobservables. If the IV estimates have 
captured a key element of how dimension of firm size do impact on earnings then these 
effects are very large and suggest new insights into what drives the heterogeneity in 
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Table 1a: 1-Year Sector Transitions - Ghana 3 Ys Panel
   Self  Priv Wage  Civil  Pub Ent  Not Working    
Self 672  66  0  2  91  831 
% 80.87  7.94  0  0.24  10.95  100 
        
Priv Wage  47  262  8  5  46  368 
% 12.77  71.2  2.17  1.36  12.5  100 
        
Civil 2  5  28  3  7  45 
% 4.44  11.11  62.22  6.67  15.56  100 
        
Pub Ent  3  15  13  20  8  59 
% 5.08  25.42  22.03  33.9  13.56  100 
        
Not Working  123  112  10  3  395  643 
% 19.13  17.42  1.56  0.47  61.43  100 
        
Total 847  460  59  33  547  1,946 
   43.53  23.64  3.03  1.7  28.11  100 
 
Table 1b: 1-Year Sector Transitions - Tanzania 3 Ys Panel
   Self   Priv Wage  Civil  Pub Ent  Total 
Self 403  19  4  2  428 
%  94.16  4.44 0.93  0.47 100 
           
Priv Wage  13  87  26  11  137 
% 9.49  63.5  18.98  8.03  100 
           
Civil 0  7  27  1  35 
% 0  20  77.14  2.86  100 
           
Pub Ent  2  9  8  18  37 
% 5.41  24.32  21.62  48.65  100 
           
Total 418  122  65  32  637 
%  65.62  19.15 10.2  5.02 100 
 
18Table 2: 1-Year Sector Transitions - Ghana 5 Year Panel
   Self  Priv Wage  Civil  Pub Ent  Not Working    
Self 1,214  104  3  2 150  1,473 
% 82.42  7.06  0.2  0.14  10.18  100 
        
Priv Wage  93  607  16  9  102  827 
% 11.25  73.4  1.93  1.09  12.33  100 
        
Civil  3  11 68  4  10 96 
% 3.13  11.46  70.83  4.17  10.42  100 
        
Pub  Ent  4  16 16  29  8 73 
% 5.48  21.92  21.92  39.73  10.96  100 
        
Not Working  184  170  17  6  920  1,297 
% 14.19  13.11  1.31  0.46  70.93  100 
        
Total 1,498  908  120  50  1,190  3,766 











19Table 3: OLS Regressions by wave and by Country
GH04 TZ04 GH05 TZ05 GH06 TZ06 GHPool TZPool
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Exp .021 .024 .039 .014 .052 .041 .042 .027
(.012)∗ (.012)∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.010) (.010)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
exp2/100 -.044 -.030 -.046 -.015 -.082 -.056 -.061 -.036
(.025)∗ (.021) (.019)∗∗ (.019) (.021)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗
Ln(Hours) .396 .025 .355 .298 .095 .102 .130 .028
(.126)∗∗∗ (.117) (.104)∗∗∗ (.136)∗∗ (.078) (.121) (.062)∗∗ (.073)
Ln(ﬁrsiz) .170 .180 .220 .168 .166 .127 .182 .149
(.030)∗∗∗ (.033)∗∗∗ (.035)∗∗∗ (.048)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.022)∗∗∗
Ln(emps) .431 .615 .170 .492 .279 .418 .267 .555
(.112)∗∗∗ (.123)∗∗∗ (.065)∗∗∗ (.135)∗∗∗ (.112)∗∗ (.130)∗∗∗ (.057)∗∗∗ (.076)∗∗∗
Tenure .030 -.006 .017 .017 .007 .007 .008 .006
(.013)∗∗ (.013) (.010)∗ (.012) (.010) (.008) (.007) (.007)
Tenu2/100 -.061 .011 -.029 -.040 .021 -.014 .0007 -.012
(.047) (.033) (.034) (.037) (.033) (.022) (.022) (.020)
Male .240 .217 .243 .299 .319 .356 .271 .313
(.071)∗∗∗ (.065)∗∗∗ (.060)∗∗∗ (.065)∗∗∗ (.055)∗∗∗ (.068)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗∗ (.044)∗∗∗
Educ -.060 .0004 -.019 -.008 -.060 .037 -.042 .010
(.023)∗∗∗ (.024) (.021) (.026) (.022)∗∗∗ (.035) (.015)∗∗∗ (.019)
Educ2/100 .601 .634 .518 .496 .804 .239 .626 .436
(.157)∗∗∗ (.183)∗∗∗ (.149)∗∗∗ (.172)∗∗∗ (.150)∗∗∗ (.239) (.105)∗∗∗ (.131)∗∗∗
Pub Ent .055 -.085 -.348 .193 -.462 .101 -.258 .112
(.201) (.215) (.197)∗ (.236) (.198)∗∗ (.186) (.127)∗∗ (.135)
Civ Ser .687 .985 .646 .908 .520 .589 .635 .826
(.109)∗∗∗ (.170)∗∗∗ (.120)∗∗∗ (.125)∗∗∗ (.108)∗∗∗ (.100)∗∗∗ (.077)∗∗∗ (.073)∗∗∗
Priv Wag -.200 -.241 -.457 -.177 -.359 -.157 -.317 -.121
(.112)∗ (.124)∗ (.111)∗∗∗ (.116) (.093)∗∗∗ (.118) (.066)∗∗∗ (.074)
Const. .208 9.626 -.087 8.735 1.181 9.293 .980 9.634
(.484) (.483)∗∗∗ (.428) (.569)∗∗∗ (.321)∗∗∗ (.511)∗∗∗ (.251)∗∗∗ (.316)∗∗∗
Obs. 617 568 817 579 995 496 2429 1643
R2 .231 .354 .29 .35 .242 .291 .232 .327
Dep.Var: Log of Real Monthly Earnings; Robust Standard Errors in parentheses; (Sig.Levels: * .10, **.05,
***.001)
20Table 4: First Stage Fixed Eﬀect Estimation
GH1 TZ1 GH2 TZ2 GH3 TZ3 P-GH P-TZ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
exp2/100 .010 .009 .021 .015 .002 .015 .012 .020
(.103) (.112) (.104) (.112) (.105) (.116) (.104) (.114)
Ln(Hours) .077 .114 .074 .085 .080 .087 .080 .090





















Ln(ﬁrsiz) .069 .087 .066 .083 .069 .086
(.030)∗∗ (.030)∗∗∗ (.030)∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗ (.030)∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗
Ln(emps) .146 .307 .145 .308 .145 .305
(.074)∗ (.085)∗∗∗ (.075)∗ (.085)∗∗∗ (.075)∗ (.085)∗∗∗
Priv Wag .040 .138 -.063 .022 -.093 -.045 -.064 .044
(.098) (.118) (.112) (.159) (.146) (.211) (.114) (.169)
Civ Ser .175 .168 .285 .342 .231 .323 .275 .396
(.148) (.165) (.154)∗ (.153)∗∗ (.189) (.197) (.158)∗ (.188)∗∗
Pub Ent .238 .244 .066 .038 .090 .112 .055 .064
(.144)∗ (.163) (.161) (.226) (.227) (.212) (.163) (.243)
2005 .128 .118 .112 .121 .109 .136 .105 .121
(.058)∗∗ (.073) (.058)∗ (.072)∗ (.059)∗ (.076)∗ (.059)∗ (.073)∗
2006 .361 .376 .346 .328 .352 .350 .344 .330
(.093)∗∗∗ (.126)∗∗∗ (.093)∗∗∗ (.124)∗∗∗ (.094)∗∗∗ (.130)∗∗∗ (.094)∗∗∗ (.126)∗∗∗
Const. 1.920 10.185 1.840 10.175 1.956 10.189 1.887 10.062
(.595)∗∗∗ (.894)∗∗∗ (.603)∗∗∗ (.890)∗∗∗ (.617)∗∗∗ (.952)∗∗∗ (.613)∗∗∗ (.921)∗∗∗
Obs. 2432 1653 2432 1652 2429 1643 2429 1643
e(N-g) 1321 961 1321 961 1320 954 1320 954
R2 .076 .097 .083 .126 .085 .136 .084 .127
Dep.Var: Log of Real Monthly Earnings; Robust Standard Errors in parentheses; (Sig.Levels: * .10, **.05,
***.001)
21Table 5: Regression of Total Individual Fixed Eﬀect
GH1 TZ1 GH2 TZ2 PREDICT-GH PREDICT-TZ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educ .006 .017 -.105 -.094 -.122 -.105
(.002)∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗
Educ2/100 1.021 1.151 1.063 1.194
(.092)∗∗∗ (.114)∗∗∗ (.091)∗∗∗ (.115)∗∗∗
Male .247 .109
(.043)∗∗∗ (.045)∗∗
Obs. 1320 954 1320 954 1320 954
R2 .004 .03 .09 .125 .112 .13
Dep.Var: ˆ θi from First Stage (obtained using the ”PREDICT” speciﬁcation); (Sig.Levels: * .10, **.05, ***.001)
22Table 6: Second Stage Regression with Indices
GH1 TZ1 GH2 TZ2 GH3 TZ3 GH4 TZ4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total Exp .041 .037 .045 .038 .042 .028 -.00002 -7.81e-11
(.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.0008) (.0009)
exp2/100 -.070 -.064 -.066 -.047 -.062 -.036 .012 .020
(.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Ln(Hours) .136 .074 .141 .053 .167 .073 .080 .090
(.064)∗∗ (.082) (.060)∗∗ (.076) (.061)∗∗∗ (.074) (.032)∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗
Ln(ﬁrsiz) .158 .155 .088 .096 .134 .109 .069 .086
(.013)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Ln(emps) .337 .538 .260 .430 .286 .540 .145 .305
(.055)∗∗∗ (.077)∗∗∗ (.055)∗∗∗ (.078)∗∗∗ (.055)∗∗∗ (.078)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗
Tenure .020 .001 .018 .004 .019 .011 -.012 .011
(.007)∗∗∗ (.008) (.007)∗∗∗ (.007) (.007)∗∗∗ (.007) (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Tenu2/100 -.015 .017 -.021 -.002 -.027 -.024 .054 -.031
(.024) (.023) (.023) (.021) (.022) (.020) (.005)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Male .265 .275 .257 .281 .249 .109
(.042)∗∗∗ (.046)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗∗ (.044)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Educ -.055 .009 -.044 .010 -.122 -.105
(.015)∗∗∗ (.020) (.015)∗∗∗ (.019) (.0005)∗∗∗ (.0006)∗∗∗
Educ2/100 .802 .637 .637 .488 1.063 1.194
(.102)∗∗∗ (.142)∗∗∗ (.106)∗∗∗ (.136)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗
Ab Ind 1.000 1.000
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Sec Ind 2.483 1.851 1.000 1.000
(.244)∗∗∗ (.193)∗∗∗ (.069)∗∗∗ (.078)∗∗∗
2005 .048 .119 .061 .102 .065 .097 .105 .121
(.040) (.038)∗∗∗ (.038) (.038)∗∗∗ (.038)∗ (.037)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗
2006 .281 .356 .301 .363 .310 .267 .344 .330
(.042)∗∗∗ (.049)∗∗∗ (.041)∗∗∗ (.046)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗ (.046)∗∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗ (.028)∗∗∗
Const. 1.061 9.810 .673 9.208 .643 9.250 1.887 10.062
(.257)∗∗∗ (.339)∗∗∗ (.245)∗∗∗ (.331)∗∗∗ (.247)∗∗∗ (.322)∗∗∗ (.127)∗∗∗ (.112)∗∗∗
Obs. 2429 1643 2429 1643 2429 1643 2429 1643
R2 .132 .142 .223 .297 .249 .335 .783 .851
Dep.Var: Log of Real Monthly Earnings; Robust Standard Errors in parentheses; (Sig.Levels: * .10, **.05,
***.001)
23Table 7: Arellano and Bond - DIFF-GMM
OLS FE FD BB1a BB1b BB1c BB1d







Total Work Experience .045
(.007)∗∗∗
exp2/100 -.062 -.006 .011 .016 .099 .127 .090
(.014)∗∗∗ (.072) (.088) (.108) (.138) (.157) (1.112)
Ln(Hours) .265 .193 .085 -.349 -.338 .026 -.765
(.052)∗∗∗ (.057)∗∗∗ (.039)∗∗ (.265) (.577) (.509) (2.118)
Tenure .007 -.014 -.024 .035 .049 .088 .014
(.007) (.013) (.013)∗ (.056) (.096) (.127) (1.825)
Tenu2/100 -.005 .052 .082 -.153 -.152 -.347 .526
(.023) (.049) (.052) (.193) (.332) (.473) (7.837)
Ln(ﬁrm size) .183 .113 .078 .138 .433 .130 .286
(.019)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗ (.202) (.222)∗ (.392) (3.549)
Ln(no. employees) .271 .120 .113 .071 -.055 -.041 -1.321
(.055)∗∗∗ (.076) (.053)∗∗ (.363) (.761) (.948) (12.523)
Private wage dummy -.354 -.285 -.218 -.945 -1.185 -.167 -.359
(.059)∗∗∗ (.097)∗∗∗ (.088)∗∗ (.645) (.767) (.988) (1.337)
civil .558 .235 .130 .853 .955 1.168 2.925
(.078)∗∗∗ (.141)∗ (.165) (.655) (1.497) (1.635) (27.383)
pubent -.231 -.163 -.156 -.461 -1.631 -1.673 -.013
(.119)∗ (.159) (.178) (.898) (.927)∗ (1.855) (7.934)
TimeDummies
Const. .245 1.616 .151
(.213) (.427)∗∗∗ (.056)∗∗∗
Obs. 3529 3529 1806 1806 1806 1806 1806
e(N-g) 1485 944 944 944 944
e(hansenp) .317 .741 .668 .
e(j) 53 29 21 13
e(ar1p) 2.88e-10 2.32e-09 7.65e-07 .243
e(ar2p) .584 .529 .428 .957
Dep.Var: Log of Real Monthly Earnings; All estimates are obtained via a Two-Step Procedure, where an optimal
weighting matrix is estimated in the ﬁrst stage and the Standard Errors are corrected using the Windmeijer
methodology; N-g: Number of Included Individuals; hansenp: p-Value of Hansen Stat; j: Number of Instruments;
arip: p-value of AR(i) statistic; (Sig.Levels: * .10, **.05, ***.001).
24Table 8: Blundell and Bond - SYS-GMM
OLS FE FD BB1a BB1b BB1c BB1d







Total Work Experience .045
(.007)∗∗∗
exp2/100 -.062 -.006 .011 .018 .017 .019 -.013
(.014)∗∗∗ (.072) (.088) (.007)∗∗ (.009)∗ (.014) (.034)
Ln(Hours) .265 .193 .085 .196 .476 .348 -.991
(.052)∗∗∗ (.057)∗∗∗ (.039)∗∗ (.187) (.218)∗∗ (.485) (1.011)
Tenure .007 -.014 -.024 -.012 -.026 -.047 -.045
(.007) (.013) (.013)∗ (.024) (.027) (.050) (.075)
Tenu2/100 -.005 .052 .082 .043 .082 .157 .281
(.023) (.049) (.052) (.087) (.105) (.174) (.240)
Ln(ﬁrm size) .183 .113 .078 .460 .443 .325 .455
(.019)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗ (.104)∗∗∗ (.119)∗∗∗ (.185)∗ (.264)∗
Ln(no. employees) .271 .120 .113 .378 .500 -.491 .098
(.055)∗∗∗ (.076) (.053)∗∗ (.156)∗∗ (.189)∗∗∗ (.685) (1.110)
Private wage dummy -.354 -.285 -.218 -.971 -.969 -.821 -.759
(.059)∗∗∗ (.097)∗∗∗ (.088)∗∗ (.308)∗∗∗ (.339)∗∗∗ (.593) (.760)
civil .558 .235 .130 .706 .699 .513 1.943
(.078)∗∗∗ (.141)∗ (.165) (.223)∗∗∗ (.194)∗∗∗ (.577) (2.286)
pubent -.231 -.163 -.156 -1.624 -1.311 -2.500 -2.068
(.119)∗ (.159) (.178) (.520)∗∗∗ (.579)∗∗ (1.604) (2.363)
TimeDummies
Const. .245 1.616 .151 1.442 .448 1.197 5.968
(.213) (.427)∗∗∗ (.056)∗∗∗ (.721)∗∗ (.866) (1.799) (3.639)
Obs. 3529 3529 1806 3529 3529 3529 3529
e(N-g) 1485 1485 1485 1485 1485
e(hansenp) .369 .249 .865 .998
e(j) 78 38 30 22
e(ar1p) 1.75e-12 1.25e-10 3.66e-07 .012
e(ar2p) .389 .358 .578 .816
Dep.Var: Log of Real Monthly Earnings; All estimates are obtained via a Two-Step Procedure, where an optimal
weighting matrix is estimated in the ﬁrst stage and the Standard Errors are corrected using the Windmeijer
methodology; N-g: Number of Included Individuals; hansenp: p-Value of Hansen Stat; j: Number of Instruments;
arip: p-value of AR(i) statistic; (Sig.Levels: * .10, **.05, ***.001).
25Figure 1: Densities of Log-Earnings for Ghana and Tanzania
26Figure 2: Predicted Time-Invariant Ability (independent of observables) - αi
27APPENDIX
Table 1: Summary Stats for entire 3wave sample GHANA
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Male 0.447 0.497 0 1
Age (years) 34.727 10.481 16.083 64.233
Age$ˆ2/100$ 13.157 7.891 2.587 41.259
Total Exp 20.284 11.431 0 57.417
exp$ˆ2/100$ 5.42 5.689 0 32.967
Educ 8.444 3.896 0 19.5
Educ$ˆ2/100$ 0.865 0.555 0 3.803
Real Monthly Earnings 17.848 17.591 0.481 207.9
Log Earnings 2.488 0.930 -0.731 5.337
hours 47.707 12.497 2 80
Ln(Hours) 3.819 0.349 0.693 4.382
Tenure 8.752 9.212 0 45.58
Tenu$ˆ2/100$ 1.614 2.708 0 20.775
employees 1.2 0.854 1 12
Ln(emps) 0.092 0.334 0 2.485
ﬁrmsize 13.424 34.711 1 150
Ln(ﬁrsiz) 0.887 1.515 0 5.011
self 0.608 0.488 0 1
Priv Wag 0.315 0.464 0 1
Public wage 0.077 0.267 0 1
2004 0.254 0.435 0 1
2005 0.336 0.473 0 1
2006 0.41 0.492 0 1
Civ Ser 0.044 0.204 0 1
Pub Ent 0.033 0.18 0 1
Country 1 0 1 1
N2 4 2 9
28Table 2: Summary Stats for entire 3wave sample TANZANIA
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Male 0.502 0.5 0 1
Age (years) 38.263 11.184 16 65
Age$ˆ2/100$ 15.89 9.192 2.56 42.25
Total Exp 25.2 12.186 2 59
exp$ˆ2/100$ 7.834 7.149 0.04 34.81
Educ 7.063 3.748 0 17
Educ$ˆ2/100$ 0.639 0.504 0 2.89
Real Monthly Earnings 87146.599 127990.06 1771.48 2170061.75
Log Earnings 10.913 0.915 7.48 14.59
hours 52.537 14.91 12 120
Ln(Hours) 3.919 0.3 2.485 4.787
Tenure 9.920 9.263 0 46
Tenu$ˆ2/100$ 1.842 3.267 0 21.16
employees 1.219 0.776 1 11
Ln(emps) 0.114 0.337 0 2.398
ﬁrmsize 14.901 38.038 1 150
Ln(ﬁrsiz) 0.809 1.565 0 5.011
self 0.637 0.481 0 1
Priv Wag 0.237 0.425 0 1
Public wage 0.126 0.332 0 1
2004 0.346 0.476 0 1
2005 0.352 0.478 0 1
2006 0.302 0.459 0 1
Civ Ser 0.083 0.277 0 1
Pub Ent 0.043 0.202 0 1
Country 2 0 2 2
N 1643
29 










Nominal GH04  cedis  32 60 83 30 71 
 TZ04  TSH  40000 80000  112500  40000 98000 
 GH06  cedis  63  83 150 45  88 
 TZ06  TSH  62500 91666  150000  65000 80000 
        
Real GH04  cedis  9 17  24 9 20 
 TZ04  TSH  36934 73868  103878  36934 90489 
 GH06  cedis  14 19 35 10 20 
 TZ06  TSH  51824 76008  124378  53897 66334 
        
USD GH  04  36 66 91 33 78 
 TZ  04 37  73 103 36  90 
 GH  06  68  90 162 49  95 
 TZ  06 50  73 120 52  64 
 
 
 
 
30